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A WITHERING INSTRUMENTALITY:
THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF
R. v. SAFARZADEH-MARKHALI AND
OTHER RECENT SECTION 7
JURISPRUDENCE
Andrew Menchynski and Jill R. Presser*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada has faced a perennial problem,
particularly since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms1 (“Charter”), in its efforts to protect the constitutional rights
of individuals without unduly interfering in the domain of the
legislative branch of government.2 A key question has been — to what
extent should the courts use section 7 of the Charter to review or
police Parliament’s decisions regarding laws that engage an
individual’s liberty interests? Indeed, this is an issue brought to the
fore in many of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decisions3 that
have struck down criminal legislation. Is the Supreme Court being too
interventionist in its approach, or is the Court rightly putting a check
on repressive legislation?

*
Andrew Menchynski, B.A. (Hons.), J.D., associate at Presser Barristers. Jill R. Presser,
B.A. (Hons.), LL.B., principal lawyer, Presser Barristers.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11.
2
See Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic
Dialogue, Revised Edition (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2016).
3
As discussed below, the Court’s recent decisions that we focus on are Canada (Attorney
General) v. PHS Community Services Society, infra, note 22; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford,
infra, note 11; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), infra, note 29; R. v. Smith, infra, note 30; R. v.
Appulonappa, infra, note 31; R. v. Lloyd, infra, note 14; and R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2016]
S.C.J. No. 14, 2016 SCC 14 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Markhali”] .
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Most recently, the Supreme Court needed to deal with this question in
R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali4 (“Markhali”). In many respects, the Supreme
Court’s decision in this case should be celebrated as an important entry in
the Court’s jurisprudence on section 7 of the Charter. Not only does the
Supreme Court re-affirm the potency of the constitutional doctrine of
overbreadth but also it creates a systematic methodology for analyzing
the statutory purpose of challenged legislation (a key focus at many
stages of Charter litigation5). The Court’s decision in Markhali leads to a
more stable and predictable application of section 7 in future cases.
However, in this article we look beyond the obvious strengths of
cases like Markhali to review the Supreme Court’s recent section 7
jurisprudence through a more critical lens. We argue that the Court’s
recent boldness in utilizing section 7 to strike down legislation may not
be as protective of substantive rights or as “interventionist” as it appears
at first blush. In particular, we argue that future litigants should be
concerned about the Court’s implicit whittling down of section 7’s
arsenal of principles of fundamental justice to the doctrines of
overbreadth and arbitrariness. This is because these principles of
fundamental justice are not “substantive”, creating no specific set of rights
that accused individuals can utilize in day-to-day litigation. We argue
that the Supreme Court’s recent trend in section 7 jurisprudence is in
reality more deferential to Parliamentary authority and less protective
of long-term individual liberties than the Court’s early6 Charter
jurisprudence.

II. MARKHALI AND THE MODERN ERA OF FOCUSING ON
“INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY”
1. The Supreme Court’s Decision in R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali
In Markhali, the Supreme Court was asked to deal with an aspect of the
Truth in Sentencing Act7 (“TISA”) that had restricted credit for pre-sentence
custody to one day for each day served (“1:1”) in situations where an
4

Id.
The interpretation of statutory purpose is key at the very least in analyses of ss. 1, 7, 12
and 15 of the Charter.
6
By “early” Charter jurisprudence, we mean the Court’s s. 7 decisions released after the advent
of the Charter in 1982 but prior to the modern age of “instrumental rationality” (as explained below).
7
S.C. 2009, c. 29.
5
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accused was detained primarily due to his or her criminal record.
Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali himself was charged with possession of marijuana
and several firearms offences. The Justice of the Peace presiding over his
bail hearing detained him and endorsed his Information pursuant to section
515(9.1) of the Criminal Code8 (the “Code”), signifying that his detention
was primarily due to his criminal record. As a result, section 719(3.1) of the
Code — enacted as part of the legislative amendments introduced under the
TISA — restricted the sentencing judge’s discretion to grant Mr. SafarzadehMarkhali credit for pre-sentence custody to a maximum of 1:1. He was
detained in pre-sentence custody for one year, eight months and 22 days,
despite making every effort to proceed to trial expeditiously.
Prior to imposing sentence, the sentencing judge agreed with
Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali that the portion of section 719(3.1) that
restricted the credit he could receive for his pre-sentence custody to 1:1
violated section 7 of the Charter in a manner that could not be justified
under section 1. The sentencing judge then awarded Mr. SafarzadehMarkhali “enhanced” credit of one-and-a-half days for each day served.9
The Crown appealed the sentencing judge’s finding.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown’s appeal, holding
that the relevant part of section 719(3.1) was not in accordance with the
process component of the principle of proportionality in sentencing —
which the Court of Appeal recognized to be a “new” principle of
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal
also found that the effects of the legislation could result in grossly
disproportionate punishments in reasonably foreseeable scenarios.10
The Crown appealed again to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Court dismissed the Crown’s appeal, but for different reasons than did
the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The Supreme Court found that the
impugned portion of the TISA violated section 7 because it was
unconstitutionally overbroad.11 The Chief Justice, writing for the
8

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2014] O.J. No. 4194, 2014 ONCA 627, at paras. 33-45 (Ont. C.A.).
10
Id., at paras. 63-101.
11
The Supreme Court described the doctrine of overbreadth in Canada (Attorney General)
v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, at paras. 112-113 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bedford”] as
prohibiting Parliament from passing laws that impact the life, liberty and security of the person of
individuals that Parliament did not intend to target:
Overbreadth allows courts to recognize that the law is rational in some cases, but that it
overreaches in its effect in others. Despite this recognition of the scope of the law as a
whole, the focus remains on the individual and whether the effect on the individual is
rationally connected to the law’s purpose. For example, where a law is drawn broadly and
targets some conduct that bears no relation to its purpose in order to make enforcement
9
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unanimous Court, found that the goal of the impugned section was “to
enhance public safety and security by increasing violent and chronic
offenders’ access to rehabilitation programs”.12 The Court found that the
impugned provision was overbroad because, despite its legislative
purpose, (1) it could foreseeably deny credit to offenders who did not
pose a threat to public safety or security and (2) it could foreseeably deny
credit to offenders whose information was erroneously endorsed under
section 515(9.1) and who could not appeal that endorsement (because the
impugned statute did not allow for any mechanism of review from a
Justice’s endorsement under section 515(9.1) of the Code).13 In this way,
the Court found that the impugned law is irrational or arbitrary “in part”
because it could affect individuals Parliament did not intend to target.
2. The Creation of the Doctrines of Overbreadth and
Arbitrariness14
The Supreme Court’s decision to rely on the doctrine of overbreadth
— rather than on the “new” principle of fundamental justice recognized
in the Court of Appeal for Ontario (i.e., the principle of proportionality in
sentencing) — was unsurprising given the Court’s frequent reliance on
this doctrine in recent years (as discussed in the next section).
Overbreadth was originally recognized as a principle of fundamental
justice under section 7 in R. v. Heywood15 (“Heywood”). In that case, the
accused challenged a vagrancy law that prohibited offenders convicted of
listed offences from “loitering” in public parks. The majority of the
Supreme Court found that the law, which aimed to protect children from
sexual predators, was overbroad because it impacted on offenders who
more practical, there is still no connection between the purpose of the law and its effect
on the specific individual. (emphasis in original)
12
See Markhali, at para. 47, supra, note 3 (emphasis in original).
13
Id., at paras. 53-54.
14
Note that, in past s. 7 cases like Bedford, supra, note 11, the Supreme Court has typically
discussed the doctrines of overbreadth and arbitrariness alongside the principle of fundamental justice that
prohibits the imposition of “grossly disproportionate” punishments. However, the Supreme Court of
Canada appears to have made clear more recently in R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”] and R. v. Lloyd, [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, 2016 SCC 13 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Lloyd”] that “gross disproportionality” should be more appropriately invoked under s. 12 of the Charter
(which prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishment). At the very least, it can be said that the principle of
fundamental justice prohibiting “grossly disproportionate” sanctions has no distinct content outside of s. 12
of the Charter. As a result, we focus in this article primarily on s. 7’s two remaining distinct principles of
fundamental justice in the modern age of “instrumental rationality”: overbreadth and arbitrariness.
15
[1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.).
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did not pose a danger to children and prohibited other offenders from
attending parks and other places where children would not be present.
Since its inception in Heywood, the doctrine of “overbreadth” lay
dormant and unpopular for nearly two decades. It was not relied on by
the Supreme Court as the basis for striking down any legislation, with the
sole exception of R. v. Demers (“Demers”).16 In Demers, the impugned
legislation prevented accused who were found unfit to stand trial from
receiving an absolute discharge, and instead subjected them to indefinite
appearances before a provincial review board. The Court found that the
purpose of the impugned legislation was “to allow for the ongoing
treatment or assessment of the accused in order for him or her to become
fit for an eventual trial”.17 The Court found that the legislation was
overbroad insofar as it applied to permanently unfit accused, i.e., those
who would never become fit to stand trial.18 Accordingly, the legislation
was found to violate section 7 of the Charter.
In this time frame, the doctrine of arbitrariness was similarly
recognized but disused. As explained in R. v. Clay,19 the doctrines of
arbitrariness and overbreadth are closely connected. Whereas
overbreadth strikes down legislation that impacts on individuals
Parliament did not intend to target, arbitrariness polices against
Parliament passing laws that do not in any substantial way advance its
legislative goals. The doctrine of arbitrariness was first conceived of by
the Supreme Court in R. v. Morgentaler,20 which is a case that dealt with
the criminalization of abortion. Three of the four of the majority judges
in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General)21 then utilized the doctrine of
arbitrariness when they dealt with a legislative prohibition on private
health insurance. Aside from these cases, the doctrine of arbitrariness,
much like overbreadth, lay largely dormant for many years.
3. The Modern Era of “Instrumental Rationality”
The doctrines of overbreadth and arbitrariness did not experience a
true resurgence until after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
16
[2004] S.C.J. No. 43, 2004 SCC 46 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Clay, infra, note 19 where the
Court makes mention of the doctrine of overbreadth but does not use it to strike down legislation.
17
Id., at para. 41.
18
Id., at paras. 42-43.
19
[2003] S.C.J. No. 80, 2003 SCC 75 (S.C.C.).
20
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
21
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35 (S.C.C.).
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Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society22 (“PHS”).
In this case, the Supreme Court was reviewing the Minister of Health’s
decision not to exempt a “safe injection site” from criminal prosecution
under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”). The Court
found that the Minister’s decision violated section 7 of the Charter
because it was arbitrary. The purpose of the CDSA was to promote
public health and safety, whereas the Minister’s decision to recriminalize
a safe injection site would imperil the lives of those addicted to drugs
who were searching for a safe place to consume them. The Supreme
Court also affirmed that section 7 protects individuals from laws that are
overbroad (which is to say, arbitrary “in part”).23
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford24 (“Bedford”), the Supreme
Court once again focused on the doctrines of arbitrariness and
overbreadth. In that case, the Court struck down a number of
prostitution-related provisions of the Code and gave Parliament one year
to craft a new legislative scheme addressing sex work. In doing so, the
Supreme Court found that “courts have explored different ways in which
laws run afoul of our basic values, using the same words — arbitrariness,
overbreadth, and gross disproportionality — in slightly different ways”.25
The Court explained that these are all examples of “failures of
instrumental rationality”26 — whereby Parliament passes legislation that
poorly achieves its aims. The Supreme Court reasoned that courts have a
duty to assess critically such “failures of instrumental rationality”. They
must perform this analysis without reviewing the substantive content of
the legislation that Parliament passes. In Bedford, such a critical
assessment of the failures of instrumental rationality resulted in the
prostitution laws at issue being struck down as unconstitutional.
Since Bedford, the Supreme Court has relied almost exclusively27 on
the doctrines of overbreadth and arbitrariness to strike down
unconstitutional legislation under section 7 of the Charter (whereas
“gross disproportionality” has now been relegated to constitutional

22

[2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.).
In R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, 2012 SCC 69 (S.C.C.), the Court re-affirmed the
existence of both doctrines in a case that dealt with the constitutionality of certain anti-terrorism offences.
24
Supra, note 11.
25
Id., at para. 106.
26
See also Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012).
27
There is one notable exception in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies
of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7, 2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.), which is discussed in more detail below.
23
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claims under section 12 of the Charter28). In Carter v. Canada (Attorney
General)29 (“Carter”), the Court relied on overbreadth to strike down
laws surrounding assisted suicide. In R. v. Smith30 (“Smith”), the Court
used arbitrariness to strike down a prohibition on medical marihuana. In
R. v. Appulonappa,31 (“Appulonappa”), the Court used overbreadth to
strike down a portion of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act32
dealing with illegal human smuggling. Finally, in Markhali, the Court
used overbreadth to strike down a provision limiting the amount of credit
awarded to offenders for serving time in pre-sentence custody.
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court envisioned section 7 as a
tool for ensuring that an impugned legislation’s objective and means are
“aligned”. In other words, the Court did not review in any of these cases
whether the legislation impacted on substantive and procedural freedoms.
That is, legislation was not struck down because Parliament impinged on
the substantive rights of Canadians — such as an individual’s right to
self-determine when they die (Carter), or their right to use “illicit”
substances to alleviate suffering (Smith), or the right to be credited fairly
for their imprisonment awaiting trial (Markhali). Instead, the Supreme
Court chose to cure each of these substantively unfair laws by
questioning whether Parliament’s legislative goals were intended to
achieve their effects. In each case, the Supreme Court also theoretically
left Parliament with the option of passing each impugned provision anew
and declaring that it did wish to achieve such an “unfairness” through its
laws (thus “aligning” goals and means and passing constitutional muster).

III. STAGNATION IN RECOGNIZING “NEW” SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
In our view, the Court’s focus on “instrumental rationality” in recent
years appears to have had a corresponding adverse impact on the
recognition of “new” principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of
the Charter.
Section 7 of the Charter protects the life, liberty and security of the
person, ensuring that these are not impacted in a manner that is not in
28
29
30
31
32

Supra, note 14.
[2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5 (S.C.C.).
[2015] S.C.J. No. 34, 2015 SCC 34 (S.C.C.).
[2015] S.C.J. No. 59, 2015 SCC 59 (S.C.C.).
S.C. 2001, c. 27.
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accordance with the “principles of fundamental justice”. As first explained
in the Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2)33 (“B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act Reference”), the Charter itself does not provide an
exhaustive list of the principles of fundamental justice. Sections 8 to 14 of
the Charter do provide enumerations or examples of the principles of
fundamental justice. However, as the Court found in the B.C. Motor Vehicle
Act Reference, it is both possible and desirable — for the sake of the health
and growth of the Charter, which the Court conceptualized to be a “living
tree” — to recognize “new” principles of fundamental justice under
section 7, not necessarily envisioned by the section’s framers. Importantly,
in that case, Lamer J. also expressly recognized that any “new” principles
of fundamental justice should not necessarily be limited to procedural
protections; they may take on the form of substantive rights.34
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a deliberate
methodology for recognizing the existence of “new” principles of
fundamental justice, and did not forbid the formation of substantive
protections. As explained in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth
and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General),35 the Supreme Court set out
the following test for determining what constitutes a “new” principle of
fundamental justice: (1) the proposed principle must be a legal principle;
(2) there must be consensus that the proposed principle is essential to our
shared notions of justice; and (3) the proposed principle must be capable
of being identified with precision and applied in a manner that yields
predictable results.
Using this test, the Supreme Court recognized a plethora of “new”
principles of fundamental justice in the Charter’s first two decades. In
addition to the principles of fundamental justice described above that
relate to legislative “failures of instrumental rationality”, the Supreme
Court has recognized a variety of other principles of fundamental justice
that protect substantive and procedural rights:36

 Criminal liability must correspond to fault: An overarching
principle of fundamental justice requires that individuals not face
criminal liability beyond that corresponding to their actual fault;37
33

[1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 63.
35
[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 2004 SCC 4 (S.C.C.).
36
This list is not exhaustive and borrowed from Dwight Newman (Main Title Contributor),
Halsbury’s Laws of Canada ‒ Constitutional Law (Charter of Rights) ‒ 2014 Reissue (available on QL).
37
See B.C. Motor Vehicle Act Reference.
34
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 No absolute liability offences when section 7 interests engaged:
When section 7 interests are at stake, including in the context of any
offence resulting in imprisonment, there is a principle of fundamental
justice prohibiting absolute liability.38

 Mens rea requirement appropriate to the stigma of offence: A more
general principle of fundamental justice within the category of those
relating to the necessity of fault for criminal liability prescribes that
the mens rea requirement in an offence must be appropriate in light
of the gravity of the offence and, especially, the stigma occasioned
by conviction;39

 Defences affecting fault: A principle of fundamental justice
mandates that defences that would negative the requisite standard of
fault, including those related to voluntariness, must be available;40

 Duty to act fairly: The principles of fundamental justice require that
any state action engaging an interest protected by section 7 must be
in accordance with duties of procedural fairness, which would appear
at a minimum to embrace the contents of natural justice;41

 Youth to be treated in a manner respecting their reduced
culpability: There is a principle of fundamental justice that youth
criminal justice must be responsive to the actual culpability of youth,
which involves a “reduced maturity and moral capacity”;42

 Full answer and defence: The principles of fundamental justice
afford significant protection to the accused’s opportunity to make use
of the adversarial system in contesting charges;43

 The right to disclosure: Section 7 gives rise to a right of full and
ongoing “first party” disclosure of evidence in the possession of the
state that is relevant to a criminal prosecution;44

38

Id.
See for example R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
40
See R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.).
41
See Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.).
42
See R. v. D.B., [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
43
See R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.).
44
See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).
39
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 The right to silence: The right to silence is a fundamental tenet of
our criminal justice system and recognized as a principle of
fundamental justice;45

 Prohibition on abuse of process: The principles of fundamental justice
also give constitutional status to prohibitions on abuses of process.46

It should not be surprising that many of these “new” principles of
fundamental justice were recognized shortly after the advent of the Charter.
The Canadian legal system had many core or fundamental values that were
not enumerated in the Charter. Section 7 thus served as a vehicle for
providing a constitutional dimension to well-recognized values that existed
long before the Charter came along. This may explain why the early days of
the Charter saw the birth of numerous “new” principles of fundamental
justice — with a relative slowdown in later years.
However, what is surprising is the near absence of recognition of
“new” principles of fundamental justice by the Supreme Court in the
years since PHS. Indeed, since there has been a revived focus in section 7
jurisprudence on “instrumental rationality”, there have been virtually no
cases where the Court recognized a “new” substantive principle of
fundamental justice. Notably, as discussed in more detail in the next
section, the Court has in fact declined to recognize some “new”
principles of fundamental justice when asked to do so in Carter, R. v.
Anderson,47 (“Anderson”), Lloyd,48 and Markhali.49
The only exception to this trend is the Court’s decision in Canada
(Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada.50 In this
case, the Supreme Court recognized the uncontroversial point that “the
lawyer’s duty of commitment to the client’s cause” is a principle of
fundamental justice and that the state cannot pass laws that would
impede a lawyer in this duty.51 However, even in this case, the Court
45
See R. v. R.J.S., [1995] S.C.J. No. 10, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451 (S.C.C.); R. v. Singh, [2007]
S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.).
46
See R. v. Jewitt, [1985] S.C.J. No. 53, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.).
47
[2014] S.C.J. No. 41, 2014 SCC 41 (S.C.C.).
48
Supra, note 14.
49
Only the latter two cases are examined in detail below. However, it should be noted that,
in Carter, the Supreme Court refused to recognize “parity” as a principle of fundamental justice and,
in R. v. Anderson, the Supreme Court declined to recognize the principle that “Crown prosecutors
must consider the Aboriginal status of the accused prior to making decisions that limit a judge’s
sentencing options” as a principle of fundamental justice (see para. 29 of R. v. Anderson).
50
[2015] S.C.J. No. 7, 2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.).
51
Id., at paras. 74-115.
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declined to deal with the argument that the independence of the bar at
large, i.e., that lawyers practising their duties should be “free from
incursions from any source, including from public authorities” — is a
principle of fundamental justice.52
This stagnation in the recognition of “new” principles of fundamental
justice has been noted by constitutional litigants. In Markhali, the
Attorneys General submitted, in response to the Court of Appeal’s
recognition of a “new” principle of fundamental justice, that the Supreme
Court has now limited the bases of the principles of fundamental justice
under section 7 to: arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality.
Given the Supreme Court’s recent trend in section 7 jurisprudence, this
argument was not without a foundation. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself
recognized the central importance of these principles of fundamental
justice in Carter:
Section 7 does not catalogue the principles of fundamental justice to
which it refers. Over the course of 32 years of Charter adjudication,
this Court has worked to define the minimum constitutional
requirements that a law that trenches on life, liberty, or security of the
person must meet (Bedford, at para. 94). While the Court has
recognized a number of principles of fundamental justice, three have
emerged as central in the recent s. 7 jurisprudence: laws that
impinge on life, liberty or security of the person must not be
arbitrary, overbroad, or have consequences that are grossly
disproportionate to their object. (emphasis added)

IV. THE WORRYING IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
FOCUS ON “INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY” IN SECTION 7
JURISPRUDENCE
We believe that the Supreme Court’s focus on “instrumental rationality”
in recent jurisprudence has changed the identity of section 7 in a
troubling manner, straying from the conception of the section originally
recognized in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act Reference. As discussed below,
the Court’s focus on “instrumental rationality” has set up a variety of
hurdles to the Charter’s ability to remain a “living tree” — one that
provides long-term safeguards against repressive legislation and that
recognizes “new” rights in response to inevitable sociopolitical, cultural
and demographic changes.
52

Id., at para. 80.
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1. The Current Supreme Court and Section 7: A Crisis of Identities
The Supreme Court’s focus on instrumental rationality is unfortunate
given the rich substantive history of section 7. As explained above,
section 7 has been used to recognize a number of procedural and
substantive protections for litigants in the criminal justice system (as well
as in some areas outside of it, including in administrative law). One need
only think of the prominence of such doctrines as “full answer and
defence”, the right to disclosure, cases establishing the requisite levels of
fault for different types of criminal and quasi-criminal offences, and the
doctrine of procedural fairness to realize how influential section 7 of the
Charter has been from a substantive rights perspective. So why should
the Court now imagine a section 7 that is mainly a tool for ensuring
Parliament’s “instrumental rationality”?
This new conceptualization of section 7 may be attributed to the
judiciary’s reluctance to be viewed as interfering with the democratic
responsibility of Parliament to pass laws. In other words, the Court may
not want to be perceived as stepping on Parliament’s toes. Judicial
activism is a practice very often debated and criticized among academics
and legal observers, especially when courts use the Charter to find
legislation unconstitutional.53 In recent years, the Supreme Court has not
shied away from striking down legislation that deals with everything
from sex work54 to various mandatory minimum sentences55 (not to
mention other hot-button cases like the “Nadon reference”56).
It may, be tempting for the Court to step away from even creating
the impression of over-activism by re-imagining section 7 as simply
dealing with the flawed rationality of bad laws — and not as a method
of interfering with the substance of Parliament’s laws. In this way, the
judicial branch can be seen to be merely policing Parliament’s good
legislative drafting practices, while in fact utilizing the doctrines of
arbitrariness and overbreadth to achieve its desired substantive results.
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See e.g., Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic
Dialogue, Revised Edition (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2016); James B. Kelly, Governing with the
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(Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press Publishers, 2006); and Rory Leishman, Against Judicial Activism:
The Decline of Freedom And Democracy in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press
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See Bedford, supra, note 11.
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See Nur and Lloyd, supra, note 14.
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2. Three Specific Worries about the Future of Section 7
Jurisprudence
We welcome the Court’s boldness in striking down a variety of illconceived “tough-on-crime” laws in recent years. We believe that
Parliament’s legislation should be rational — in the sense that it should
not be arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate. However, we
also believe that this development in the identity of section 7 — as
merely a tool to ensure the “instrumental rationality” of legislation —
should be worrying to future litigants for at least three reasons.
First, our concern is that, while arbitrariness and overbreadth have
been useful doctrines to date, their utility in scrutinizing unfair
legislation will diminish in the future. In Markhali, the Supreme Court
set out a very detailed roadmap for how courts should assess legislative
purpose. The Court outlined a step-by-step approach for determining
legislative purpose that relies on sources produced almost exclusively by
the legislature: (1) pre-ambles to Parliamentary bills, (2) any text, context
and scheme of the legislation; and (3) extrinsic evidence, such as
speeches made by the Minister of Justice introducing the legislation. The
result is that, as argued by Marcus Moore in his recent analysis of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Markhali,57 it will now be easier for
the legislature to pass constitutional laws:
In our system of government with its separation of powers and judicial
review checking unconstitutional action by the state’s democratic
organs, Markhali’s Rigorous Approach to purpose construction may
significantly improve “communications” between legislatures and
courts. Because the Rigorous Approach is both transparent and
consistent, legislatures should generally be better-equipped to
appreciate what makes laws unconstitutionally overbroad,
discriminatory in purpose, unjustifiable in their rights limitations etc.
This will encourage legislatures to be much more clear about the
legislative object, within the authoritative sources that courts look
to as indicia under the Rigorous Approach. (emphasis added)

No person interested in the rule of law could reasonably take issue
with a system that favours instrumentally rational laws.58 However, this
57
Marcus Moore, “R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali: Elements and Implications of the Supreme Court’s
New Rigorous Approach to Construction of Statutory Purpose” (2017) 77 S.C.L.R. (2d) 223 at 249.
58
Indeed, it could be said that the right to be free from instrumentally irrational laws is, in
itself, a type of substantive right. However, our point in this article is that section 7 ought to be
imbued with more than just this one set of protections.
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approach risks giving Parliament the tools to insulate substantively
problematic legislation from constitutional scrutiny. In other words,
because the doctrines of overbreadth and arbitrariness are simply
concerned with aligning statutory purpose and effect, it will be easy
enough for legislators and legislative drafters to ensure that otherwise
unfair laws pass constitutional muster. All that Parliament needs to do is
simply to make sure its legislative sources articulate, without ambiguity,
its objectives — even if the objectives themselves are substantively
unfair or unjustly target and punish the politically and socially powerless.
Indeed, in 2014, the federal government of the day attempted to do
exactly that when passing the Protection of Communities and Exploited
Persons Act (“Bill C-36”) — which was their legislative response to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bedford. The government passed legislation
that was substantially similar to the laws struck down by the Supreme
Court. However, they included with Bill C-36 a lengthy pre-amble that
is, as was noted in Parliament, “unusual” in its meticulous outline of the
government’s statutory purposes for passing the Bill. Similarly, the
Minister of Justice, Peter MacKay, made a point of stressing the aims of
Bill C-36 in his speeches in Parliament. He emphasized that Bedford was
decided on the premise that sex work was legal in Canada, and that the
new legislation intends to deter sex work and to make it illegal.59 The
government’s painstaking efforts to detail Bill C-36’s purpose highlights
the need for concern: an unfair law may, in this way, be protected from
section 7’s scrutiny simply because it passes the test of instrumental (but
not substantive) rationality.
Our second concern is that, even if this generation of the Supreme
Court has utilized instrumental rationality to strike down substantively
problematic laws, this may not necessarily happen with other Supreme
Courts in the future. The problem is that a decision based on an
“instrumentality analysis” generally does not entrench itself in “horizontal”
or “vertical” stare decisis beyond the question of whether a specific
impugned provision violates section 7.60 In other words, any analysis that
declares any given legislative provision unconstitutional on the basis of
“instrumental irrationality” does not bind other courts that are analyzing
59

Speech by Hon. Peter MacKay at Second Reading of Bill C-36, Official Report of
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different statutes or provisions. For example, simply because the portion
of the TISA analyzed in Markhali was found to be unconstitutional does
not even mean that other portions of the legislation that restrict presentence credit to 1:1 in a different context61 are unconstitutional. On the
other hand, if the Supreme Court in Markhali had declared “fair credit
for pre-sentence custody” and/or the “principle of proportionality in
sentencing” (as discussed below) to be principles of fundamental justice,
then it would be much more difficult for other courts to uphold any 1:1
legislative restriction on pre-sentence credit in other contexts.
Accordingly, a section 7 imbued with substantive content is much more
likely to safeguard rights and liberties through the doctrine of stare
decisis in the future. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine many existing
substantive rights recognized under section 7, such as the right to receive
disclosure or the right to have the Crown prove a certain level of fault in
any given criminal prosecution, being abolished or revised by a future
Supreme Court.62
Importantly, we must also note that an instrumentality analysis only
appears to be value-neutral and objective. However, the doctrines
animating “instrumental rationality” are actually open to easy
manipulation, for “rationality” is in the eye of the beholder. As noted by
the Supreme Court itself in R. v. Moriarity,63 it is very easy to change the
interpretation of a statutory purpose in order to achieve a desired result.
On the one hand, “[i]f the purpose is articulated in too general terms, it
will provide no meaningful check on the means employed to achieve it:
almost any challenged provision will likely be rationally connected to a
very broadly stated purpose”.64 On the other hand, “if the identified
purpose is articulated in too specific terms, then the distinction between
ends and means may be lost and the statement of purpose will effectively
61
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62
However, we should note that, although it is difficult to revise existing substantive
protections recognized under the Charter, it is certainly not impossible. See, e.g., R. v. Nedelcu,
[2012] S.C.J. No. 59, 2012 SCC 59 (S.C.C.) and the previous line of cases interpreting the
protections afforded by s. 13 of the Charter.
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[2015] S.C.J. No. 55, 2015 SCC 55 (S.C.C.). In this case, the Supreme Court was
deciding whether provisions of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 were overbroad.
The impugned provisions made it an offence, even when not on military duty, to engage in
conduct prohibited under an underlying federal statute (including the Criminal Code) and to
engage in fraudulent conduct. The Supreme Court engaged in an analysis of the appropriate
level of generality at which the purpose of an impugned provision must be cast before finding
that s. 7 was not violated.
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Id., at para. 28.
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foreclose any separate inquiry into the connection between them”.65
While Markhali attenuates this problem with its “Rigorous Approach”66
to interpreting statutory purpose, it would be somewhat naïve to believe
that results-oriented statutory interpretation can be eliminated in its
entirety. It will be possible in almost any case to put a spin, even if
unintentionally, on the statutory objectives of the legislation being
reviewed — and, particularly in close cases, this will make all the
difference in deciding whether a law is instrumentally rational. As a
result, future Supreme Courts that are more deferential to Parliament
may interpret the purposes of impugned laws in a way that is much more
likely to align them with their effects.
Third, we believe that a focus on “instrumental rationality”
undermines the philosophical underpinnings of section 7. As explained
by Lamer J. in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act Reference, the Charter is a
“living tree” that is intended to give a constitutional dimension to the
substantive liberties and rights recognized as essential in the
continuous present. The Charter should not be frozen in time or
dependent on Parliament’s ability to align the purposes and means of
its legislation. Instead, the Charter is intended, at least in part, to be an
instrument that gives voice to those who often cannot be heard by
politicians focused on pleasing their constituents. Because “new”
principles of fundamental justice can always be recognized by the
courts as there are shifts in the social milieu, we believe that section 7
provides the best opportunity for protecting the substantive rights and
liberties of the socio-politically “excluded” in the long-term future.67
However, for this to occur, section 7 needs to be imbued with
“substantive” rather than just “relative” principles of fundamental
justice. Indeed, as discussed above, this is the only hope for securing
the longevity of past section 7 victories.
65
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V. R. V. SAFARZADEH-MARKHALI: AN EXAMPLE OF THE COURT’S
MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO RECOGNIZE AN IMPORTANT “NEW”
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLE OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
To understand the need for a substantive section 7 of the Charter, one
need only examine the Supreme Court’s recent refusals to recognize
“new” principles of fundamental justice. In both Markhali and Lloyd, the
Court recently had an opportunity to recognize the “principle of
proportionality in sentencing” as a principle of fundamental justice. The
Court refused to take this opportunity, declining even to conduct the test
set out in Canadian Foundation for Children Youth and the Law v.
Canada (Attorney General) (discussed above) for what constitutes a
“new” principle of fundamental justice. Had the Court done so, we
believe the principle of proportionality in sentencing would have easily
qualified as a principle of fundamental justice:
 First, the principle of proportionality in sentencing is a wellarticulated legal principle, which has now been defined with
precision by section 718.1 of the Code;
 Second, the Supreme Court in R. v. Ipeelee,68 (“Ipeelee”) (and other
cases) has already recognized that the principle of proportionality in
sentencing is the central driving force that allows for “the maintenance
of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just
sanctions”;
 Third, as recognized by Wilson J. in B.C. Motor Vehicle Act
Reference, judges have been successfully applying the principle of
proportionality “for over a hundred years”, yielding predictable and
just results.
Indeed, the Code enshrines proportionality as the “fundamental
principle” of sentencing under section 718.1. Moreover, as recently
recognized by the Supreme Court itself in Ipeelee, “proportionality is the
sine qua non of a just sanction” and a “central tenet of the sentencing
process” that existed long before the Code enshrined it as a fundamental
principle of sentencing. The principle of proportionality is fundamental
to society’s notions of just sentencing that is individualized and fair.
Ironically, both in Ipeelee and Anderson, the Supreme Court expressly
recognized the principle of proportionality in sentencing as a principle of
68
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fundamental justice. Justice LeBel expressly explained in Ipeelee
that he found the principle of proportionality to be a principle of
fundamental justice:
…The fundamental principle of sentencing is that the sentence must be
proportionate to both the gravity of the offence and the degree of
responsibility of the offender. As this Court has previously indicated,
this principle was not borne out of the 1996 amendments to the Code
but, instead, has long been a central tenet of the sentencing process
[…] It also has a constitutional dimension, in that s. 12 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms forbids the imposition of a grossly
disproportionate sentence that would outrage society’s standards of
decency. In a similar vein, proportionality in sentencing could aptly
be described as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the
Charter. (emphasis added)

However, when faced with the notion of striking down legislation in
Markhali and Lloyd based on the principle of proportionality in sentencing,
the Court unexpectedly changed course. In Markhali, the Court reasoned
that section 7 only protects against grossly disproportionate sentences:
“Parliament can limit a sentencing judge’s ability to impose a fit sentence,
but it cannot require a sentencing judge to impose grossly disproportionate
punishment” (emphasis added).69 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found
that the Court of Appeal for Ontario erred when it recognized this “new”
and substantive principle of fundamental justice.
However, what the Supreme Court failed to recognize is that the
principle of proportionality in sentencing has two distinct components: a
result component and a process component. The result component demands
that the substantive quantum of the sentence be within a range of
punishments acceptable to the moral compass of society. The process
component requires sentencing judges to impose punishment by focusing
on an individual’s moral blameworthiness and degree of responsibility, as
opposed to other arbitrary or irrelevant factors (and is thus closely related to
the principle of parity).70 It is only when both components are satisfied that
a sentence can accord with the principle of proportionality in sentencing:
 First, society must generally decide how severely to punish a type of
wrongdoing. In other words, punishment must be anchored to the
seriousness of a type of crime. A “mandatory minimum” sentence,
69
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See R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2014] O.J. No. 4194, 2014 ONCA 627, at paras. 73-86
(Ont. C.A.).
70

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

SECTION 7 JURISPRUDENCE

93

for example, is Parliament’s expression of what a fair quantum of
punishment is for a type of crime. Starting points and ranges are also
expressions of fair punishments for categories of crime. Through
these mechanisms, it is decided generally what type of a punishment
or result fits a type of crime.71
 Second, just punishment must be individualized to ensure that people
are punished relative to others. Justice demands that those who are
more blameworthy receive a harsher sanction. On the other hand, if
the moral blameworthiness and the degree of responsibility of two
individuals are identical, their punishment should be roughly
identical. In order to individualize punishment in this manner, a
sentencing judge must follow a process through which he or she
identifies the particular blameworthiness and degree of responsibility
of the individual(s) being sentenced.72
Importantly, the deferential standard of gross disproportionality does
not logically apply to the process component of the principle of
proportionality. As Strathy J.A. recognized in the Court of Appeal’s
decision in Markhali, an individual is always “entitled to a process
directed at crafting a just sentence”, regardless of the resulting
punishment.73 The existence of a process that individualizes punishment
based on moral wrongdoing is not a question of degree or “grossness”.
Courts must simply look at the legislative context and decide whether
that fair process exists or not.
Indeed, Parliament is only in the best position to decide generally what
constitutes a fair result or quantum of punishment for a type of crime (i.e.,
the first step described above). This is because the moral compass of society
fluctuates with time and changing socioeconomic circumstances. For
example, society has viewed certain sexual offences and gun offences much
more seriously in the last decade or two than in previous decades. Being a
democratically elected institution, Parliament is in the best position to gage
the social response of the community and determine the exact “price” (or
the parameters thereof) that must be paid for a type of crime.
71
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However, only the courts can meaningfully individualize punishment.
Parliament does not and cannot legislate punishments tailored to each
particular crime and every unique offender that passes through the
criminal justice system. As a result, sentencing judges must evaluate the
personal circumstances and moral blameworthiness of each offender, and
they must compare different offenders and what they did wrong relative
to each other. Only after this comparison process can sentencing judges
impose equal punishment under the law. Without this kind of individualized
tailoring of sentences to the circumstances of the offence and the offender,
punishment would not “fit” the offender: unequally blameworthy individuals
would receive equal punishment, and equally blameworthy individuals
would receive unequal punishment.
Importantly, courts and academics have long recognized the
importance of procedural fairness in sentencing. In R. v. Smith,74 Lamer
J. explained that an arbitrary or unfair sentencing process may violate
section 7 of the Charter even if the resulting punishment is not grossly
disproportionate pursuant to section 12 of the Charter. Justice Lamer
employed similar terminology to that used by the Court of Appeal in
Markhali when he explained the difference between the “effect” and the
“process” of a punishment:
On more than one occasion the courts in Canada have alluded to a further
factor, namely, whether the punishment was arbitrarily imposed. As
regards this factor, some comments should be made, because arbitrariness
of detention and imprisonment is addressed by s. 9, and, to the extent that
the arbitrariness, given the proper context, could be in breach of a
principle of fundamental justice, it could trigger a prima facie
violation under s. 7. As indicated above, s. 12 is concerned with the
effect of a punishment, and, as such, the process by which the
punishment is imposed is not, in my respectful view, of any great
relevance to a determination under s. 12. For example, s. 12 would not
be infringed if a judge, after having refused to hear any submissions on
sentencing, indicated that he would not take into consideration any
relevant factors, but then went on to impose arbitrarily a preconceived but
appropriate sentence. In my view, because this result would be
appropriate, the sentence cannot be characterized as grossly
disproportionate and violative of s. 12. (emphasis added)

Unfortunately, despite its own precedent recognizing the need for
a fair sentencing process, the Supreme Court in Markhali appeared
74
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reluctant to recognize that section 7 provided any substantive protections.
Accordingly, the Court would not enshrine a just and individualized
sentencing process under the auspices of section 7. Instead, the Supreme
Court once again chose to focus on instrumental rationality, striking
down legislation simply because Parliament did not match up the
legislation’s objectives and its effects. The result is that Parliament
remains free today to legislate a sentencing process that violates the “sine
qua non of just sanction” because such legislation would apparently not
violate our principles of fundamental justice.
In our view, this is an alarming development. The principles of
proportionality in sentencing and the closely associated principle of parity
satisfy the pre-conditions for being recognized as principles of fundamental
justice. Recognizing these principles as principles of fundamental justice
would not mean an inconsistency between the standards set out in sections 7
and 12 of the Charter. As explained above, the standard of gross
disproportionality only speaks to the ultimate quantum of sentence. However,
regardless of the quantum of sentence, all Canadians expect that individuals
receive an individualized and fair sentencing process. In our view, fairness in
the sentencing process is not a controversial proposition — and one that
should have received the protection of section 7 of the Charter. Prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Markhali and Lloyd, several other courts across
the country agreed that section 7 should be imbued with this substantive
protection.75
Markhali should thus serve as a watershed moment. It is a symptom
of how an exclusive focus on instrumental rationality can lead to an
ignorance of substantive liberties and protections that are fundamental to
our notions of fairness.

VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, we believe that a section 7 laden with substantive
principles of fundamental justice is the only way to maintain an adaptive
and strong Charter that safeguards individual liberties independent of the
dominant ideological discourses of the day. Although the doctrines of
arbitrariness and overbreadth have served an extremely important
function in the last several years of section 7 jurisprudence, we believe
their usefulness in the future may be limited. At the very least, we think it
75
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would be naïve to believe that these two principles of fundamental
justice can provide for a meaningful or indefinite check on repressive or
unduly punitive legislation.
In fact, there are already signs — as evident in the legislative record
involved in passing Bill C-36 in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bedford — that Parliament is adapting and may be able to
insulate substantively problematic laws from instrumentality assessments
in the future. Once that happens, we will be poorly equipped to address
the true evil underlying “law and order” legislation that often imposes
unworkable, “one size fits all” punitive responses to complex social
problems. Indeed, that true evil is the substantive unfairness and social
harm of these types of laws — not their “instrumental irrationality”.
Future section 7 litigants thus have a responsibility to keep
confronting the Supreme Court of Canada with attempts to recognize
further “new” substantive principles of fundamental justice. The
doctrines guaranteeing “instrumental rationality” in legislation should be
one of the many tools in section 7’s repertoire; they should not be
section 7’s only tools. This is the only way to ensure that the Charter
protects Canadians, especially those who are the least socially and
politically powerful in our society. Otherwise, we risk bankrupting the
arsenal of our future substantive rights by letting section 7 — a central
branch of our communal “living tree” — wither away.

